The new wastewater treatment plant is also used by the city of Hancock. Cost sharing of the debt between the two cities is based on historical usage of water. Like Houghton, Hancock has announced a metered rate increase to cover its share of debt retirement.
A metered rate is a user fee resulting in a positive price for incremental water use. A metered rate allows for a number of possible price structures, such as uniform rates, which may vary from peak to off-peak periods; block rates, which result in a rate change for water used beyond a certain amount; and step rates, which result in a different rate on all Copyright 1994 by the American Geophysical Union.
Paper number 94WR01384. 0043-1397/94/94 WR-01384505.00 water used during a billing period once usage exceeds a given amount [e.g., Young et al., 1983; Lyman, 1992] .
In contrast, a flat rate, or lump sum charge, results in a zero price for incremental water use. The frequently cited study by Hanke[ 1970] found that substituting a metered rate The purpose of this paper is to analyze some economic issues involved with the policy of raising the metered water rate to obtain additional revenue to fund debt retirement. In particular, we address the following question: Rather than raising the metered rate, should a city choose to raise the tax rate levied under its local property tax? In addressing this question, two points are stressed. First, an increase in the metered rate raises revenue and decreases consumption and hence the variable (operating) cost associated with the provision of water. Second, raising property taxes to fund debt retirement allows home owners who utilize tax deductions or credits to shift some of the burden to other taxpayers. The accounting stance adopted here is purely local, and the tax shift to other areas is therefore ignored. As we will demonstrate, the optimum mix of metered revenue and property tax revenue depends on various parameters faced by decision makers.
Tax Setting
Unlike payments arising from a combined metered waterwastewater rate, property taxes are deductible under the federal income tax. In effect, this tax preference subsidizes the consumption of local public services for individuals who itemize on their federal income tax form.
Generally, if r is the proportional tax rate applied to residential real estate with an assessed value (the tax base) of V, property taxes paid, T, equal rV. Let t represent the percentage of a $1 increase in T offset by the federal deduction for itemizing federal taxpayers. Thus the deduction of T lowers the effective "price" of local government services from T to (1 -t)T. Since we focus on the provision of water and wastewater services, henceforth we assume that property taxes, T, are earmarked for the waterwastewater utility.
In addition, many states, including Michigan, have a "circuit breaker" that provides a refund of state income taxes if residential property tax payments exceed a specified percentage of the taxpayer's income. A circuit breaker works like a tax deduction except that the net cost of a $1 increase in T is reduced by the credit rate c rather than the taxpayer's federal marginal income tax rate t. In other words, c represents the percentage of property tax offset by the property tax credit against the state's income tax. However, if the decrease in state income tax of c reduces the federal deduction by c, federal taxes would increase by ct, resulting in the taxpayer's losing the federal deduction. In this case, the net cost to the circuit-breaker-qualifying household of increasing T by $1 is 1 -tc + ct = (1 -t)(1 -c). Therefore the appropriate method of financing the debt on the new wastewater treatment plant is of interest to those taxpayers who itemize and also to those for whom c is nonzero. Houghton city officials were asked why the city did not raise property taxes to meet the debt payments associated with the new wastewater treatment plant. Their immediate response was: "If we did that we would be giving a free ride to the largest single user of water in the city." This user is Michigan Technological University (MTU), which utilizes approximately 50% of the water distributed (see Table 1 ). The city of Houghton sends out approximately 1400 monthly water bills in addition to MTU's, of which approximately 1200 are to residential customers. Excluding MTU' s approximately 7000 students, Houghton's population is approximately 7500 (1990 census).
For Michigan taxpayers
Is it always in the interest of home owners to initiate a price policy which prevents a university or other large, tax-exempt users from taking a free or "easy" ride with respect to locally provided public services? An extreme example shows why the answer to this question is no. Suppose that all home owners of a community pay 0% of marginal property tax increases (c = 1). In this case, they could shift the entire debt burden to the state government by setting the metered rate equal to 0 and financing both debt and variable cost out of property taxes. All water customers would be free riders.
As demonstrated in the next section, city officials should recognize an important trade-off when choosing a price policy. Raising the property tax rate does result in tax savings to some home owners, which lowers their net expenditure on the public service. However, a corresponding decrease in the metered rate is likely to increase water consumption, which in turn raises variable cost.
Modeling
Suppose a city comprises two types of home owners: those for whom c or t (or both) > 0 and home owners for whom c = t = 0. We assume that the city government chooses the metered rate and property tax level so as to minimize total expenditure (EXPEND) on municipal waterwastewater services by both sets of home owners, subject to the constraint that the water-wastewater utility budget be balanced. City officials are viewed simply as agents elected by home owners (principals), and they serve the interests of home owners. We abstract from any analysis of the principal-agent problem the case in which agents pursue personal goals that conflict with principals' interests [Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1992, p. 625].
While a municipality may face an upper limit on its property tax rate, we assume that this constraint is not binding and nothing restricts decision makers from using property tax revenue to fund debt retirement payments. Since we assume an exogenous property tax base V, choosing the property tax rate r is equivalent to choosing the property tax level T. Thus city officials choose T and P so as In treating a as exogenous, we ignore two possible cases that an increase in r can cause: (1) taxpayers who were previously ineligible for the credit or previously not federal tax itemizers become eligible or itemize with the new higher property tax rate and (2) taxpayers reach the maximum allowable credit (in Michigan the maximum credit is $1200).
Note that in equations (1) 
The sign of the term dR v/dP is dependent upon the magnitude of O v. if the university's demand for water is inelastic (Or > -1), the fight-hand term dRv/dP is a component of the marginal benefit to home owners of increasing P. It captures the increased revenue collected from the university rather than through the property tax. As long as the universi.ty has an inelastic demand for water, dR v/dP > 0, city officials view it as a nonvoting cash cow. The more inelastic ©v, the more "liquid" the cash cow. In conversation with the director of facilities management at MTU, we were informed that "MTU would most likely not attempt to cut back on water consumption, given the recently announced rate increase; decreasing consumption would only result in a higher metered rate." Therefore it appears that MTU is not prepared to initiate any conservation policies. This suggests that the university's price elasticity of demand, © t•, might be near 0 over the relevant price range. Thus (11) might be satisfied by an equality, in which case minimizing EXPEND requires that both T and P be greater than 0 and the optimum metered rate be less than the average total cost. The university would be an easy rider, since it would pay a smaller portion of the debt retirement than its portion of total water consumption. An important message is that no matter how liquid the cash cow is, city officials should not ignore the tax advantages available to home owners through revenue mechanisms other than metered rates.
Short-and Long-Run Implications
Suppose city officials ignore tax preferences associated with property tax financing (T = 0). In the short run, with a balanced budget, the metered rate (P) equals the average total cost (ATC) but exceeds marginal cost (MC). However, in the long run (D = 0), P = MC, resulting in an efficient level of water consumption. These results are summarized in columns 1 and 3 of Table 2. With T > 0, in the short run, the balanced budget constraint requires that T be either less than, equal to, or greater than D. In column 2 of Table 2, these three outcomes are labeled 1, 2, and 3, respectively. However, in the long run, P is less than MC, causing the consumption of water to exceed the efficient level. The overconsumption of water occurs because someone else is subsidizing local consumption.
Thus another important message is that introducing the property tax instrument into the water pricing policy initiates the long-run problem of inefficient use of society's resources.
Concluding Remarks
This paper demonstrates that depending on values for demand, cost, and tax parameters, the common practice of average total cost pricing might be inferior to price policies which involve financing some or all debt retirement and possibly even some of the variable cost through property taxes. In order to do what is best for some customers (home owners), it might make sense to give other customers (e.g., a university) an easy fide, even if the latter is viewed by the municipality as a cash cow.
From the perspective of home owners, the appropriate price policy requires that city officials (1) be aware of the possible trade-offbetween tax advantages, variable cost, and revenue obtained from large, tax exempt users of water and (2) obtain reliable estimates of relevant parameters.
Our analysis has focused on the short-run interest of home owners within a given community. We have drawn attention to the fact that taking advantage of the tax code's favorable treatment of property tax financing results in a long-run inefficient allocation of resources and raises issues related to the distribution of income within and across communities.
